S1. Evolutionary stable equilibria in the asymmetric VOD
have shown by means of analyses of replicator dynamics and simulations that the asymmetric VOD with one strong player hast two evolutionary stable equilibria (ESE). Figure S1 illustrates the main result of their analyses. In one ESE (sink point A in Figure S1 ), the strong player always cooperates and the weak players never cooperate. In the second ESE (sink point E in Figure S1 ), the strong player never cooperates and the weak players cooperate with probability * ⁄ . In other words, in the second ESE, the weak players ignore the strong player and behave in accordance with the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the symmetric VOD with n -1 weak players.
Note that the saddle point F in Figure S1 corresponds to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the asymmetric VOD. Like the other saddle point C and the source points B and D, F does not constitute a stable equilibrium state of the game. Moreover, the first ESE (A) corresponds to the equilibrium selected by rationality theory and also has a larger basin of attraction than the second ESE (E) (He et al., 2014) . We therefore base our predictions for the asymmetric VOD on the first ESE, in which the strong actor always cooperates while all weak actors abstain from cooperation. Figure S6 shows the individual (a), group (b) and efficient group veto rate (c) across treatments in the last 15 rounds (with a penalty threat for thieves). Except for the group veto rate, the results shown in Figure 
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